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TORT DAMAGES-MEDICAL PROVIDER'S
CHARGES AND RANGE OF PAYMENTS
ACCEPTED FOR SERVICES RENDERED IS
ADMISSIBLE UNDER SECTION 79G-LA W V
GRIFFITH, 930 N.E.2D 126 (MASS. 2010)
The Massachusetts Legislature enacted Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 233, section 79G ("Section 79G") to address the admissibility
of a plaintiff's medical bills "as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge"
for the services provided.' When Massachusetts courts examined Section
79G to determine the permitted scope of that evidence, however, they also
had to consider the common law collateral source rule, which prevents a
defendant from "show[ing] that a plaintiff has received other compensation
for his injury from some other source." 2 In Law v. Griffith,3 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") considered the admissibility of the
plaintiffs medical bills under Section 79G and the collateral source rule,
where the amounts actually paid by the plaintiff or a collateral source, and
accepted by the medical providers, were significantly lower than the
amounts that the providers had billed.4 The SIC held that pursuant to
Section 79G, a medical provider's bill is admissible on the question of the

reasonable value of medical care for the plaintiff's personal injuries, even
though that bill may reflect amounts significantly higher than the amounts
actually paid.5 In addition, the court held that while evidence of the
amounts actually paid to the provider is not admissible, the defendant could
introduce evidence of the possibility of payments made by third parties, as
I

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2000) (delineating evidentiary admissibility of

medical and hospital services); see also infra note 28 (providing relevant statutory language).
2 See Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1009 (Mass. 2009) ("The collateral source rule
required that the amounts actually paid to the health care providers by the health insurer be
redacted on the medical bills admitted in evidence."); see infra notes 18-22 and accompanying
text (discussing both traditional and Massachusetts's collateral source rule). "The rationale
behind [the] . . . 'collateral-source rule' is that the receipt of such income does not lawfully
reduce the plaintiffs' damages, 'yet jurors might be led by the irrelevancy to consider plaintiffs'
claims unimportant or trivial or to refuse plaintiffs' verdicts or reduce them, believing that
otherwise there would be unjust double recovery."' Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802
(Mass. 1985) (quoting Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)).
3 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010).
4 Id. at 128 (discussing issue before the court).
5 See id. at 128, 130 (stating statute "unambiguously" permits admission of medical bills to
establish reasonable value of services rendered).
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well as the range of payments that the
provider accepts for the types of
6
services that the plaintiff had received .
In Law v. Griffith, the plaintiff, Joanne Law, sustained injuries in
an automobile accident when her vehicle was struck by another vehicle
driven by the defendant, Daniel Griffith. 7 Law's injuries required surgery
and physical therapy, and she subsequently filed a negligence action
against Griffith in the superior court. 8 Prior to trial and pursuant to Section
79G, Law filed a notice of her intention to submit copies of her medical
bills into evidence. 9 In response, Griffith filed a motion in limine to
exclude those medical bills, arguing that Law had not paid the actual
amounts expressed on the bills that she sought to admit.' 0 The trial court
allowed Griffith's motion, concluding that the bills were not relevant in
proving the value of the medical services that Law had received." Rather,
the judge found that the appropriate measure of damages was the amount
that Law's insurer had actually paid, as opposed to the amount charged. 12
At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Law, finding that Griffith was seventy-five percent liable for Law's
injuries, awarding her $48,500.00.1'

Accounting for Law's twenty-five

percent liability, the judge reduced that award by $12,125.00, and after
further reductions for the amount of personal injury benefits that Law had
already received, which totaled $7,818.50, the court entered judgment for
Law in the amount of $28,556.50.14 Law appealed the jury's award of
6 See id. at 128, 135 (noting statute does not define permissible scope of testimony or use of
medical records).
7 Id. at 128 (summarizing facts established at trial).
8 Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Mass. 2010) (noting injuries giving rise to suit).
9 Id. Law's medical bills totaled $112,269.94 and included medical charge write-offs for
which Law would never be required to pay. Law v. Griffith, No. 07-P-1972, 2009 WL 652945, at
*1 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 13, 2009) (noting Griffith's argument that totaled amount was
"misleading").
10 Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 128-29. Law was a participant in MassHealth, which is the
Massachusetts Medicaid program. Id. at 129. Thus, under the terms of Law's medical providers'
agreements with MassHealth, the providers had accepted amounts that were much smaller than
the amounts expressed on the bills that Law sought to introduce in evidence. Id. The parties
stipulated that the amount that had been paid by Law or by collateral sources totaled $16,387.14.
Id.
I Id. at 129 (summarizing trial court's findings).
12 See Griffith, 2009 WL 652945, at *1; see supra note 9 (noting defendant's argument). It
was as a result of this ruling allowing Griffith's motion in limine that the parties stipulated to the
$16,387.14 total for which actual payments had been made. Griffith, 2009 WL 652945, at *1 n.4.
Thus, because the invoices that Law sought to admit totaled $112,269.94, the stipulated amount
constituted a difference of $95,822.80. Id. at *1.
13 Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129.
14 Id.
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damages, asserting error in the trial judge's exclusion of the medical bills.15
The Massachusetts Appeals Court concluded that it was error to preclude
Law from introducing the medical records that reflected the amount that the
providers charged, and the court reversed and remanded the case to the
superior court. 16 Griffith then sought further appellate review, and the
SJC-agreeing with the appeals court-similarly reversed the judgment of
the superior court and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. 17
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1979) ("Restatement")
states that the collateral source rule provides that "[p]ayments made to or
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited
against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the
harm for which the tortfeasor is liable." 8 Under this rule, "collateralsource benefits" received by a plaintiff do not reduce his or her recovery
against the defendant. 19 The rule promotes a theory of tort deterrence by
preventing a tortfeasor from benefitting from certain acts of the injured
person or a third party. 20 Furthermore, the rule protects against the
15 Id. The jury's findings concerning each party's respective liability was not raised on
appeal. Id. at 129 n.4.
16 Griffith, 2009 WL 652945, at *2.
17 Criffith,
930 N.E.2d at 136.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A
(1979).
19 See id. cmt. b; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages

§ 392 (2010) ("[U]nder the collateral-

source rule, generally ... benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of
and collateral to the wrongdoer do not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the
wrongdoer."). A "collateral source" is one that comes from a person or party other than the
defendant. See 2 JACOB A. STEIN, Adjustments and Limitations to Awards, in STEIN ON PERS.
INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 13:5 (3d ed. 2010) ("A 'collateral source' is usually defined as a
payment that is independent of the defendant and one that the defendant played no part in
creating.") (internal citations omitted); see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392, supra (defining
"collateral" as "not lineal, but upon a parallel or diverging line"). The types of benefits expressly
covered by the Restatement's collateral source rule include: insurance policies; employment
benefits that are either gratuitous or pursuant to an employment contract or worker's
compensation; gratuities, which includes cash gratuities or the rendering of services; and social
legislation benefits, such as social security, welfare, and pensions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 920A cmt. c (1979). Some jurisdictions draw distinctions as to the type of benefits
received, and "in limited instances these benefits may ... decrease the damages recoverable." 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 392, supra. Massachusetts, however, recognizes a broad range of
benefits that fall under its collateral source rule, including compensation received from an
insurance policy, workman's compensation, an employer, or "other sources." See sources cited
infra note 22 (noting benefits protected by the rule).
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) ("[I]t is the position of the
law that a benefit that is directed to the injured party should not be shifted so as to become a
windfall for the tortfeasor .... [I]t is the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that
he causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives."); see also Christopher J.
Eaton, Comment, The Kansas Legislature ' Attempt to Abrogate the Collateral Source Rule:

Three Strikes and They're Out?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 914 (1994) ("Basic justifications for the
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possibility of jury prejudice or confusion, which would likely arise if the
judge admitted evidence proving the existence of such collateral sources. 2'
Massachusetts recognizes the collateral source rule, and its courts have
generally followed the traditional language of the rule.22
Nevertheless, as the Restatement points out, the collateral source
rule is "of common law origin and can be changed by statute. ,21 Indeed,
the majority of states, including Massachusetts, have modified the
traditional language of the collateral source rule through legislation. 24 For
rule resort to principles of equity . . . and signify a preference for the deterrence purpose of tort
law."). The SJC recognized that one purpose behind the collateral source rule is to deter
negligent conduct by placing the full cost of the wrongful conduct on the tortfeasor, stating:
The duty imposed by law upon [the defendant] is to compensate the plaintiff[] for all
the damage done by his negligence . . . .That obligation is not fulfilled because it
happens that the plaintiffs [received a collateral source benefit] ....Compensation for
the defendant's wrong is not thereby furnished by the defendant. Such payments by
the [collateral source] do not concern and should not benefit the defendant. They have
no bearing on his liability or opon [sic] the extent of the plaintiffs' injury ....
Shea v. Rettie, 192 N.E. 44, 46 (Mass. 1934) (holding insurance payments received by plaintiff
properly disregarded by trial judge in determining damages award).
21 See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802, 810 (Mass. 1985). The Corsetti court
stated that "[t]he rationale behind [the] . . . 'collateral-source rule' isthat the receipt of such
income does not lawfully reduce the plaintiffs' damages, 'yet jurors might be led by the
irrelevancy to consider plaintiffs' claims unimportant or trivial or to refuse plaintiffs' verdicts or
reduce them, believing that otherwise there would be unjust double recovery."' Id. at 802
(quoting Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass. 1974)). The Corsetti court also
concluded that where the defendant "specifically wished" to influence the jury, it was a proper
exercise of the trial judge's discretion in deciding that admission of collateral source evidence
would be confusing to the jury. Id. at 810 (stating trial judge "reasonably fear[ed]" such evidence
"'becomes too confusing"').
22 See, e.g., Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1009 (Mass. 2009) (stating defendant
may
not show plaintiff received compensation for injury from "other source") (citing Corsetti, 483
N.E.2d at 803); Jones v. Town of Wayland, 373 N.E.2d 199, 207 (Mass. 1978) (holding liability
shall not be reduced by compensation received from insurance policy); Goldstein, 309 N.E.2d at
202-03 ("[A] defendant may not show that the plaintiff has received other compensation for his
injury, whether from an accident insurance policy, from workmen's compensation, from an
employer, or from other sources.") (citations omitted). But cf infra notes 25-26 (noting several
exceptions to Massachusetts's application of the collateral source rule).
23 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. d (1979); see also sources cited infra
notes 24-25 (listing examples of statutory modifications made in various jurisdictions, including
Massachusetts).
2
See Bryce Benjet et al., A Review of State Law Alodifying the Collateral Source Rule:
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 211, 226
(2009) (finding majority of jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, have enacted statutes
restricting collateral source rule); see infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing
Massachusetts's statutory modification to collateral source rule). According to Benjet's study,
"[o]f the fifty States and the District of Columbia, [a total of] forty-two jurisdictions have enacted
...some form of statute that restricts the collateral source rule[,]" and "where the rule has been

298

SUFFOLKJOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVI

example, the Massachusetts statute creating an exception to the common
law collateral source rule provides that, in medical malpractice cases,
collateral source benefits may be introduced into evidence when
determining awards of medical damages. 25 Furthermore, noting a common
law exception, the SJC has recognized that "in some circumstances,
evidence of collateral source income may be admissible, in the discretion
of the trial judge, 'as probative of a relevant proposition, say.., credibility
of a particular witness."' 2 6 Notwithstanding the aforementioned exceptions,
Massachusetts courts generally apply the common law collateral source

rule as it has traditionally been interpreted.27
The Massachusetts Legislature enacted Section 79G in 1958 to
codify the admissibility of evidence used to determine the "fair and
reasonable" value of medical charges incurred by an injured plaintiff.28

applied generally, collateral source damages are often limited." Benjet, supra, at 211. The
purpose of these statutes is to prevent a plaintiff from being over-compensated. Id.
25 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000) (allowing reduction of damages award
where defendant introduces evidence of insurance payments made to plaintiff). While the statute
applies only to liability claims against a healthcare provider, it allows the court in such cases to
reduce the damages award by the amount paid by a collateral source. See id. at § 60G(b); see also
Benjet, supra note 24, at 226. Nevertheless, there is an "exception to the exception" in that
Section 60G does not allow a judge to reduce a damages award by collateral source benefits that
the plaintiff received pursuant to federal law. See ch. 231, § 60G(c); see also Benjet, supra note
24, at 226 (noting reduction allowed by statute does not apply where subrogation based in federal
law). Additionally, the statute does not apply to amounts paid by the plaintiff for his or her own
insurance benefits. See ch. 231, § 60G(b); see also Benjet, supra note 24 at 226 (noting statutory
language allowing court to offset reduction by payments made by plaintiff). For example, the
courts have interpreted Medicaid write-offs to be collateral source payments that reduce the
plaintiff's damages award under Section 60G. See Sylvestre v. Martin, No. SUCV2003-05988,
2008 WL 82631, at *4-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2008) (discussing why Medicaid write-offs do
not fall within Section 60G(c) exemption); cf Harlow v. Chin, 545 N.E.2d 602, 610-11 (Mass.
1989) (concluding Medicaid payments fall within reduction exemption because State's
reimbursement plan required by federal law). In Sylvestre, the court stated that "although paid
Medicaid benefits are a collateral source whose right of subrogation is based in federal law, a
Medicaid write[-]off is not an amount received by the plaintiff from a collateral source for
purposes of § 60G(c) and therefore may be deducted from a damages award." 2008 WL 82631,
at *4.
26 Corsetti, 483 N.E.2d at 802 (quoting Goldstein, 309 N.E.2d at 205).
27 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing recognized exceptions of
common law collateral source rule in Massachusetts). The SJC has noted that it prefers to leave
any common law modifications to the legislature, and, therefore, will modify common law
principles only when legislative intent is clear. See Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass'n v.
Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass. 1990) ("We will not presume that the
Legislature intended ... a radical change in the common law without a clear expression of such
intent."); cf Falmouth OB-GYN Assocs. v. Abisla, 629 N.E.2d 291, 293 (Mass. 1994) (noting
court's interpretation of statute modifying common law should advance purpose of legislature).
28 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2000). The first sentence
of the statute provides,
in relevant part:
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Notwithstanding Section 79G, Massachusetts courts have long recognized
the right of a plaintiff to recover reasonable expenses incurred for medical
treatment of injuries caused by a defendant tortfeasor. 29 Nevertheless, it
was the Massachusetts case Scott v. Garfield3 ° that first demonstrated the
potential conflict between the collateral source rule and Section 79G.3 1 In

In any proceeding commenced in any court, commission or agency, an itemized bill
and reports, including hospital medical records, relating to medical, dental, hospital
services, prescriptions, or orthopedic appliances rendered to or prescribed for a person
injured ... shall be admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such
services or the necessity of such services or treatments ....
Id. The second sentence of the statute, which pertains to the summoning of witnesses or records,
provides:
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit the right of any party to the
action to summon . . . such physician, dentist, pharmacist, retailer of orthopedic
appliances or agent of such hospital or health maintenance organization or the records
of such hospital or health maintenance organization for the purpose of cross
examination with respect to such bill, record and report or to rebut the contents thereof,
or for any other purpose, nor to limit the right of any party to the action or proceeding
to summon any other person to testify in respect to such bill, record or report or for any
other purpose.
Id. The statute creates an exception to the hearsay rule and it permits a party to introduce medical
bills for "two distinct purposes." Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Mass. 2010). First, in
proving damages, a party may introduce medical bills to demonstrate the reasonable value of
medical services rendered. See Victum v. Martin, 326 N.E.2d 12, 15-16 (Mass. 1975). Second, a
party may introduce medical bills to show the necessity of the services that the provider rendered.
See Gompers v. Finnell, 616 N.E.2d 490, 492-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
29 See Rodgers v. Boynton, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Mass. 1943) ("A plaintiff who has suffered
physical injury through the fault of a defendant is entitled to recover for ... reasonable expenses
incurred by him for medical care and nursing in the treatment and cure of his injury .... ") (citing
Daniels v. Celeste, 21 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. 1939)) ("It is settled that ... the reasonable value of
necessary medical and surgical care and of nursing is an element of damage .... ); see also 1
MARC G. PERLIN & DAVALENE COOPER, Medical expenses, in MASS. PROOF OF CASES CIV. §
14:15 (3d ed. 2010) (noting reasonable value of medical, surgical, and nursing care is element of
damage).
30 912 N.E.2d 1000 (Mass. 2009).
31 See id. at 1009-10 (noting defendants sought to challenge application of collateral source
rule when determining reasonable medical expenses). In Scott, the defendants requested that the
jury's consideration of the plaintiffs reasonable medical expenses be limited to those medical
bills that were actually paid to the plaintiffs health care provider, as opposed to the amounts that
were billed. See id. at 1009. The SJC held that the trial judge properly denied the motion, stating
that "[t]he collateral source rule required that the amounts actually paid to the health care
providers by the health insurer be redacted on the medical bills admitted in evidence." Id. The
SJC further noted that pursuant to Section 79G, the defendants could have challenged the
reasonableness of the medical bills. See id. at 1010 n.l (suggesting defendants challenge "by
summoning [plaintiff's] medical providers for cross-examination with respect to the bills"). The
SJC did not, however, consider this argument in deciding Scott. See infra note 32 and
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Scott, however, the SJC simply raised, but did not analyze, this potential
conflict because the defendants had "made no evidentiary proffer ... that

would have laid the foundation for such a challenge." 3 2 Nonetheless, the
case recognized the significance of the conflict between the common law
collateral source rule and the right of an injured plaintiff to recover his
reasonable medical expenses, noting that it was a matter of great concern in
many jurisdictions.33
accompanying text (stating Scott court's suggested argument for defendant was dicta). Justice
Cordy, in his concurrence, illustrated the "tension" between the collateral source rule and the
defendant's right to challenge the plaintiff's medical expenses. Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1011-12
(Cordy, J., concurring) (characterizing issue as "one of considerable controversy" in courts and
legislatures nationwide).
32 See Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1009-10 (noting why court did not analyze issue). Similarly, in
his concurring opinion, Justice Cordy stated:
Massachusetts appellate courts have not had occasion to decide whether evidence of a
discount from the initial charges for medical services is barred by the collateral source
rule, or whether the discounted amount paid and accepted in full satisfaction of those
charges is relevant and admissible on the issue of the reasonable value of the medical
services for which plaintiff is entitled to recover. Because the defendants did not make
a sufficient offer of proof to preserve and present the issue in this case, I would hold
that for future cases such evidence is not barred by the collateral source rule and may
be admitted (together with the initial medical bills) for the jury's consideration of the
reasonable medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff.
Id. at 1011 (Cordy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
33 See id. at 1011-12 (Cordy, J., concurring). "A majority of the courts that have considered
the issue have concluded 'that plaintiffs are entitled to ... recover the full amount of reasonable
medical expenses charged, based on the reasonable value of medical services rendered, including
amounts written off from the bills . . .' Id. (quoting Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d
487, 495 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)). These courts concluded either that a discount on medical
charges "is itself a form of benefit ... provided by a collateral source," or that admitting evidence
of amounts actually paid "would ...

allow in through the back door ...

[evidence] that the bills

[had] been paid by a collateral source." Id. at 1012. However, some jurisdictions disagree with
the majority view. See id. at 1012-13 (adopting minority view). Justice Cordy noted that the
Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, held that because "'[t]he collateral-source rule does not
apply to write-offs of expenses that are never paid[,] .... admitting evidence of [those] write-offs
does not violate the ... collateral-source rule."' Id. at 1013 (first alteration in original) (quoting
Robinson v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Ohio 2006)). The Supreme Court of Indiana adopted
a similar approach. See Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 858 (Ind. 2009) ("The collateral
source statute does not bar evidence of discounted amounts in order to determine the reasonable
value of medical services."). In reaching its decision, the Stanley court considered the structure
of the current health care payment system. See id. at 857-58 (concluding "health care pricing
structures" make determining medical services' reasonable value more valuable). The court
remained "unconvinced that the reasonable value of medical services is necessarily represented
by either the amount actually paid or the amount stated in the original medical bill." Id. at 857.
The concerns expressed by the Stanley court are both well-warranted and well-supported. See
Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New

Af/edical Mfarketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 661-66 (2008) (discussing disparity in, and
unreasonableness of, prices charged by doctors and hospitals); see James McGrath, Overcharging
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In Law v.Griffith, the SIC again considered the admissibility of
medical bills under Section 79G, but for the first time directly addressed its
apparent conflict with the collateral source rule by analyzing the
permissible scope of evidence introduced under the statute and used to
determine the fair and reasonable value of medical services.3 4 First, the
SIC promptly answered the question concerning a medical bill's general
admissibility under the statute, and found that Section 79G required the
trial judge to admit the plaintiff's medical bills in evidence.35 The SIC
reasoned that the statutory language of Section 79G is "clear," and thus, the

statute "must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the
language used. 3 6 Accordingly, the SIC noted that "Section 79G states
unambiguously that medical bills are admissible to establish the reasonable
value of services rendered., 3 7 Thus, the SIC held that it was error for the
trial judge to rule that the plaintiff s medical bills were inadmissible.38
The Griffith court next addressed the conflict between Section 79G

the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater Share of Uncompensated Afedical Care Costs to
the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPiAC L. REV. 173, 183-85 (2007) (alleging medical providers
"list price" is inequitable and "meaningless").
34 See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Mass. 2010) (summarizing lower court's ruling
and noting issue before the SJC). First, the Griffith court noted the parties' arguments on appeal
and analyzed the general admissibility of medical bills under Section 79G, id. at 129-30, and
next, stated what evidence could assist the jury in determining "reasonable value" without
undermining the collateral source rule, id. at 135-36. In this case, the issue concerning the
general admissibility of the medical bills was significant because the plaintiff sought to establish
the reasonable value of medical services rendered by introducing invoices that showed the total
amounts that her medical providers had charged, even though the amounts she actually paid were
significantly lower. See id. at 128-29.
35 See id. at 130; see also infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation
of Section 79G and SJC reasoning).
36 Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130. The SJC noted for what purposes a party may introduce
medical bills under Section 79G. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing "two
distinct purposes").
37 Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130. The SJC noted that Law had signed a "routinely required
contract" with her medical providers when they rendered medical services. Id. Under this
agreement, Law was made personally liable for the costs of any treatment regardless of whether
her insurer, MassHealth, paid for any part of that treatment. Id. Specifically, because Law was a
participant in MassHealth, requirements of the program preempted this agreement between
herself and her providers. Id. Consequently, the SJC stated that although the agreement was
ultimately unenforceable, injured parties in other circumstances for instance, when an
enforceable agreement does exist could be liable under the terms of those agreements. Id.
Nevertheless, the SJC reasoned that notwithstanding any agreement between a plaintiff and his or
her providers, the fact remained that the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Section 79G, which
declares that a medical bill is admissible on the question of the reasonable value of medical care,
and that the court is "not free to override that lawful determination." Id.
38 See id. (stating SJC's holding concerning admissibility of medical bills under first sentence
of Section 79G).
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and the collateral source rule, focusing its analysis on whether evidence of
the actual amounts paid to the plaintiffs medical providers was also
admissible.3 9 The SJC first examined the history and purpose of the
collateral source rule, declaring that the common law rule has both
"substantive" and "evidentiary" components, while its overall purpose is
tort deterrence. 40 Next, in its attempt to balance Section 79G with the
collateral source rule, the SJC-addressing the issue first raised by Justice
Cordy's concurrence in Scott-questioned whether the collateral source
rule should limit the types of rebuttal evidence admissible under the statute
in light of the substantive, evidentiary, and tort deterrence principles of the
traditional common law collateral source rule. 4' The court relied in
39 See id. at 131 (introducing second issue before the court). The
SJC noted that analysis of
this issue requires consideration of Section 79G as well as the Massachusetts common-law
collateral source rule. Id. It recognized that both sentences of Section 79G addressed evidence
used for the purpose of determining the fair and reasonable charge for medical services: language
in the first sentence "provid[es] explicitly for the admission [of such] evidence"; the second
sentence "clearly bears on the issue ... as well." Id. More specifically, the SJC noted that the
second sentence "affirms . . . the right of any party to call witnesses and to summons other
medical records for purposes of conducting cross-examination and offering rebuttal evidence with
respect to the plaintiff s proffered medical bills." Id.
40 See id. at 132 (introducing justifications for collateral source rule). The Griffith court first
noted the two operative uses of the collateral source rule, stating that the "substantive aspect...
relates to the law of damages," and that the "evidentiary component ... governs what types of
evidence may be admitted in evidence at trial." Id. The substantive aspect relates to the fact that
collateral source compensation to a plaintiff for his or her injury is "legally irrelevant" because
the collateral source rule prohibits the defendant's liability from being reduced by "outside
source" compensation. See id. (quoting Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 203 (Mass.
1974)). The evidentiary component, on the other hand, is that evidence of collateral source
compensation is inadmissible due to the risk of jury confusion or prejudice. See id. ("'[J]urors
might be led by the irrelevancy' to reduce or deny recovery.") (quoting Goldstein, 309 N.E.2d at
203). The court concluded its discussion of the collateral source rule by affirming that the
purpose behind the rule is tort deterrence. See id. The court explained the principle of the rule
that a tortfeasor must compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused and, therefore, must not
benefit from insurance or gifts intended to compensate the plaintiff. See id. The SJC further
noted the reasoning that "avoiding a windfall to a tortfeasor is preferable even if a plaintiff
thereby receives an excessive recovery in some circumstances." Id.
41 See id. at 132-33 (recognizing "growing tension" between Section 79G and the
collateral
source rule). Referring to Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000 (Mass. 2009), the Griffith court
noted that the Scott court stated in dicta that admitting evidence of amounts actually paid would
violate the collateral source rule. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 132. The Griffith court determined
that Scott's suggestion that "the collateral source rule should limit the types of rebuttal evidence
admissible under the second sentence of [Section] 79G is a significant question." Id. at 133.
Noting the current structure of the health care system, the SJC acknowledged that such a question
is an important one because "[a plaintiff's] medical bills admissible under the first sentence of
[Section] 79G may bear little relationship to the 'fair and reasonable' value of medical services
rendered." Id. (citing Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1013 (Cordy, J., concurring)). Concerning medical
bills, the court reasoned that the "charge structures" of medical providers and health insurers play
a powerful role and likely do not reflect the reasonable value of the medical services rendered to
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particular on the second sentence of Section 79G, noting its "general
language" authorizing the use of witness testimony or medical records, as
opposed to the "very specific ... directive" framed by the first sentence of
the statute.42 Ultimately, the SJC held that a reasonable way to apply the

statute, without undermining the collateral source rule, is to allow a
defendant to introduce evidence of a medical provider's stated charges, as
well as the range of payments43 that the provider accepts, for the types of
services the plaintiff received.

the patient. Id. Moreover, it noted that actual amounts paid by a collateral source, especially an
insurer, raise similar concerns because the amounts paid depend on factors such as "the
bargaining power of the insurer," or statutory limits on collateral source compensation. Id. at
133-34. Thus, the SJC reasoned that evidence of actual amounts billed and actual amounts paid
are subject to many outside factors that "have nothing to do with the tortfeasor." Id. at 134.
Accordingly, the court held that admission of actual amounts would violate the collateral source
rule because a jury may be led improperly to either award that actual amount, or award nothing at
all, believing that the plaintiff did not pay any expenses herself. Id. Furthermore, the SJC stated
that if actual amounts did not reflect the reasonable value of the medical services rendered,
admitting those actual amounts would run counter to common law principles governing medical
damages incorporated by Section 79G. Id. Finally, the court voiced concern over creating
"different classes of plaintiffs" and that "[t]he potential for unequal treatment of [these] classes
may be particularly pronounced . . . [where] medical expenses are covered by a federally
regulated program such as [MassHealth]." Id. at 134 n. 11.
42 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135. The SJC approached its analysis of the second
sentence
of Section 79G by first discussing legislative modifications to the collateral source rule. Id. at
134-35. The SJC referenced Massachusetts's modification of its collateral source rule under
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231, section 60G and concluded that such a "narrowly
tailored" statutory modification demonstrates "legislative awareness" of the collateral source rule.
Id. at 134; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing statute and its modification
of collateral source rule). Thus, the Griffith court reasoned that the collateral source rule "should
continue to operate without alteration in connection with awards of medical damages outside of
the medical malpractice arena-that is, in the types of cases covered by [Section] 79G." Griffith,
930 N.E.2d at 134. Accordingly, it concluded that further modifications to the collateral source
rule should be left to the Massachusetts Legislature. Id. Having determined this, the SJC next
decided that considering the "over-all focus" of the statute it must determine the scope of the
second sentence of Section 79G whilst "protect[ing] the core of the collateral source rule." Id. at
135. Specifically, the court stated that "the second sentence uses more general language [than the
first], authorizing the summoning of witnesses or records without delineating in any manner the
permissible scope of the witnesses' testimony or the use of the records." Id.; see also supra note
28 (providing statutory text of second sentence of Section 79G).
43 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135-36. Specifically, the SJC stated:
[A] reasonable way to implement the second sentence of [Section] 79G is to permit the
defendant to call a representative of the particular medical provider whose bill the
defendant wishes to challenge, and to elicit evidence concerning the provider's stated
charges and the range of payments that that provider accepts for the particular type or
types of services the plaintiff received. In this context, it would appear appropriate for
the witness to acknowledge that the range of payments being testified to reflects
amounts paid by both individual, self-paying patients and third-party payors .... But
the witness [or any written evidence] would not be permitted to identify the plaintiff's
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In Law v. Griffith, the SIC affirmed that a plaintiff s medical bills
are admissible in evidence to determine the reasonable value of medical
services. 44 Further, while the actual amounts paid to medical providers is
inadmissible, the SIC stated that a defendant is permitted to elicit certain
testimony concerning the amounts accepted for the types of services
rendered to the plaintiff.4 The Griffith court correctly analyzed existing
statutory and common law principles and properly balanced
Massachusetts's collateral source rule against Section 79G.46 The SJC's
holding neither destroys traditional common law precedent, nor undermines
Section 79G or its legislative intent.47 Moreover, Griffith demonstrates the
SJC's ability to consider the realities of the modern healthcare and
insurance structure, and the ever-changing relationship between that
system's individual, state, and private actors. 48
Thus, the decision
insurer or third-party payor, or to testify to [or to indicate] the amount actually paid on
the plaintiff's behalf.
Id. at 135 (citations omitted). The court continued:
In other words, the witness would be limited to testimony solely about the amounts in
the range that the provider accepted for the services at issue, with no information
relating to what was paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff herself. With its emphasis on
range of payments, such evidence could assist the jury in identifying as [Section]
79G indicates should be done what might be a fair and reasonable charge for the
services at issue. At the same time, the evidence would not undermine the collateral
source rule, because it would not touch in any manner on whether, or in what amount,
collateral third parties (whether a private insurance company, Medicare, [MassHealth,]
or Medicaid) had paid for the medical treatment the plaintiff received.
Id. at 135-36. To establish some parameters provided its holding, the SJC listed several examples
of permissible testimony. See id. at 136 n.15. For example, a witness may testify about a
medical provider's billing and discounting practices or the "general relationship between charges
and reasonable value, or discounted payments and reasonable value." Id. Finally, the SJC
indicated that jury instructions may be modified to address the relevance of a plaintiff's medical
insurance: How plaintiffs medical expenses were paid or covered "is not relevant . . . to
determine the fair and reasonable value of the ...

medical services ...

provided, as well as...

any medical services that are likely to be necessary in the future." Id. at 136.
44 See id. at 130; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing SJC's
reasoning).
45 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135-36; see also supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text
(analyzing SJC's reasoning concerning second sentence of Section 79G).
46 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 131-36; see also sources cited supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text (examining statutory language of Section 79G and interpreting collateral
source rule).
47 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing traditional collateral
source
rule); supra notes 28-33 (describing history and purpose of Section 79G).
48 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 133-34 (recognizing changes in current healthcare and
insurance procedures). The SJC properly considered the arguments raised by Justice Cordy in
Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1010-14 (Mass. 2009) (Cordy, J., concurring). See Griffith,
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successfully incorporates modern policy arguments while safeguarding the
collateral source rule's longstanding purposes. 49
Following obvious precedent, and applying a plain reading to
Section 79G, the SJC correctly stated that the "clear" language of the
statute requires a court to admit a plaintiff's medical bills to determine the
reasonable value of medical services.50
The SJC made this initial
conclusion with ease, for a decision to the contrary would undoubtedly
conflict with legislative intent because the text of the statute plainly permits
an "itemized [medical] bill" to be admitted in evidence. 5' Given the clear
statutory language available to the SJC for interpretation, as well as recent
and relevant precedent, the significance of the Griffith decision lies not in
the SJC's holding concerning the first sentence of Section 79G, but rather
in the SJC's interpretation of the second sentence of the statute.5 2 It was
there that the court sought to establish the boundaries of permissible
testimony that an opponent would likely seek to elicit when attempting to
discredit a plaintiffs portrayal of the "reasonable value" of medical
services rendered.5 3 Nevertheless, these boundaries may prove vaguer than

930 N.E.2d at 133. The SJC recognized the "increasing role" of public and private health insurers
and their influence over medical care providers. Id. Considering the current state of the
healthcare system, the Griffith court agreed with Justice Cordy's observation that medical bills
may in fact "bear little relationship" to Section 79G's "fair and reasonable charge" for services
rendered because of the extent of negotiations that occur between insurers and medical providers.
Id. at 133.
49 See supra note 48 (discussing SJC's review of modem healthcare and insurance
procedures); supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting how to apply Section 79G without
undermining collateral source rule).
50 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 130. In Griffith, the SJC affirmed statements that it had
previously made in Scott concerning a plaintiffs medical bills. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 129; see
also Scott, 912 N.E.2d at 1009 ("[Section 79G] provides that bills for medical services 'shall be
admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such services."') (quoting MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2000)).
51 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2000). The first sentence of Section 79G expressly
provides that "an itemized bill and reports . . . shall be admissible as evidence of the fair and
reasonable charge for such services." Id. (emphasis added). Use of such evidence is allowed
"[i]n any proceeding commenced in any court," and, in addition to "itemized bills," the statute
permits the introduction of other evidence, including "reports" and other "medical records." Id.
Moreover, the Scott court addressed this same issue and reached a similar conclusion. See supra
note 50 (noting Scott precedent). Accordingly, the Griffith court concluded that the language of
Section 79G is clear and must be interpreted plainly. See supra notes 27, 36-37 and
accompanying text (discussing court's method of interpretation when statutory language is clear).
52 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing plain meaning of first sentence of
Section 79G); see infra note 53 (considering implications of SJC's holding concerning second
sentence of Section 79G).
53 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 131-36 (dedicating majority of opinion to analysis of collateral
source rule and second sentence of Section 79G).
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54
the Griffith court intended, and the opinion is not without potential flaws.
In an attempt to explain the limits of the Griffith holding, the SIC
provided several examples of both permissible and impermissible
testimony concerning a plaintiffs medical bills and the reasonable cost of
services rendered. 55 Nevertheless, practitioners may attempt to expand the
SIC's holding by broadly comparing the type of testimony the SIC has
explicitly prohibited, versus the type of testimony it merely suggested is
permissible.56 Thus, in attempting to establish certain parameters for
courtroom litigators, the SIC may in fact have sown the seeds of future
confusion concerning evidentiary issues.57 Griffith may also fail to protect
against potential issues of jury prejudice that may arise when a jury hears
testimony concerning a medical provider's range of payments that it
accepts for the types of services rendered to the plaintiff 58

See id. at 136-37 (Cowin, J., concurring) ("[The majority] employs ... a policy-laden,
murky construction that will be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to apply, and that well
may lead to inaccurate verdicts."); see infra text accompanying notes 55-58 (discussing Griffith's
guidance and potential issues arising therefrom).
55 See generally Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135-36.
56 See id. at 134-35. The SJC stated that the second sentence of Section 79G
uses "more
general language" than the first sentence of the statute, and that it does not "delineat[e] in any
54

manner the permissible scope of the witnesses' testimony or the use of the records." Id. at 135.

The opinion offers the types of evidence that are not permitted: testimony or other evidence that
identifies the plaintiff's insurer or other collateral source, or any type of evidence indicating the
amounts actually paid. See id. The opinion also suggests, however, some forms of permissible
testimony: examination concerning the provider's stated charges, the range of payments a
provider accepts for those services, and how those ranges reflect amounts actually paid by an
individual or collateral source. See id. Thus, although the SJC provided some guidance
concerning permissible testimony, the fact that the court noted the "general" nature of the second
sentence may lead some legal practitioners to journey outside of Griffith's suggested parameters.
See id. at 136-37 (Cowin, J., concurring) (expressing unease with majority's characterization of
second sentence as "general").
57 See supra note 56 (discussing potential issues with Griffith's holding). It may not be clear,
for example, to what extent evidence of "the range of payments that [the] provider accepts for the
particular type or types of services the plaintiff received" falls within Griffith's permissible scope
of testimony. See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 135; see also supra note 56 (indicating concern over
Griffith's classification of second sentence of Section 79G as "general" in nature) (quoting MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79G (2000)). In attempting to follow Griffith's directives, it may prove
difficult for defendants to elicit testimony that does not identify exact amounts actually paid,
while still providing the defendant a fair chance to challenge a plaintiff's bills. See supra note 56
(discussing potential issues with Griffith's holding).
58 See Griffith, 930 N.E.2d at 134 & n.11 (addressing issue of potential misuse of evidence
by the jury). Although the court recognized the potential for jury prejudice, and thus noted the
importance behind the collateral source rule, its holding in Griffith may not protect against the
potential risk of juror prejudice. See id. at 134. The Griffith court stated:
[A]dmission of [actual] amounts [paid], precisely because they reflect what was paid
and accepted by the plaintiff's medical providers for the services rendered, may well
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In Law v. Griffith, the SJC addressed not only the general
admissibility of a plaintiffs medical bills under Section 79G, but also the
permissible scope of evidence concerning those bills and their use in
determining the fair and reasonable value of medical services rendered to
the plaintiff Relying on the common law collateral source rule and the
plain language of Section 79G, the Griffith court decided that a plaintiffs
medical bills are admissible under the first sentence of the statute. More
significantly, however, the SJC further concluded that while amounts
actually paid by the plaintiff or a collateral source are inadmissible, a
defendant may introduce evidence concerning a medical provider's stated
charges and the range of payments that the provider accepts for the types of
services billed. Thus, although a defendant challenging the reasonableness
of charges on a plaintiff s medical bills may not introduce evidence of what
was actually paid on the plaintiffs behalf, the defendant is provided a
considerable opportunity to elicit other testimony concerning those charges
and the potential payments accepted. In its interpretation of Section 79G,
the SJC produced a well-reasoned and well-supported opinion that
considers longstanding principles of the collateral source rule, while
incorporating the modern realities of the healthcare and insurance system.
Although lower courts dealing with similar cases in the future may struggle
to prevent jury prejudice and confusion arising out of Griffith's directives,
vigilant oversight of attorney examination, followed by thorough jury
instruction, should limit these potential issues.
Matthew Blum

lead a jury to award the plaintiff exactly that amount for medical damages or, perhaps,
no medical damages at all in the belief that the plaintiff did not pay the expenses
herself but relied on insurance or another third party to do so. Such a result would run
counter to the collateral source rule.
Id. But see id. at 138-39 (Cowin, J., concurring) (dismissing majority's concerns of potential
juror prejudice). Similarly, if a jury is to hear the "range of payments" that a provider accepts
i.e., "actual" payments that it does accept for those types of services-the result may very well be
the same. See id at 134 (majority opinion) ("[Admitting actual amounts paid by an insurer]
would run counter to the collateral source rule . . . . [And, it] would also contravene our
established common-law rule of medical damages that has been adopted by and codified in
[Section] 79G.").

